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3 dealing with errors in professional service firms
Martin Stollfuß, Jost Sieweke, Michael Mohe, and 
Hans Gruber
intRoduction
it is unlikely for employees to commit no errors. this can be ascribed to human charac-
teristics such as opportunistic behavior and limited skills and knowledge, as well as to 
latent conditions within organizations (Reason, 1990). organizations are therefore 
forced to deal with errors in order to reduce potentially negative outcomes. effective error 
management involves minimizing the negative potential of errors (e.g. van dyck, frese, 
baer, & sonnentag, 2005) and deriving positive effects such as learning (argyris, 1976, 
1993; edmondson, 1999; festner et al., 2005; Gartmeier, bauer, Gruber, & Heid, 2008; 
nordstrom, Wendland, & Williams, 1998). the literature identifies several constituents 
of effective error management, including quick error detection, communication about 
errors, sharing of error knowledge, and quick error handling (van dyck et al., 2005). for 
analytical reasons, these aspects of effective error management are often discussed sepa-
rately in the literature. nevertheless, the literature on learning from errors (bauer, 2008: 
33) and error management (van dyck et al., 2005) indicates that successful error manage-
ment should be understood as a process whose starting point is closely related to the 
detection of errors (figure 3.1).
in particular, error handling, error detection, and communication about errors are 
regarded as the hallmarks of effective error management (van dyck et al., 2005). error 
handling is related to damage control, which directly affects profit and important media-
tors like reputation, while error detection and communication are closely related to 
organizational learning, an important mediator of firms’ performance. the creation and 
distribution of knowledge about errors is also believed to influence a firm’s performance. 















Figure 3.1 Elements of an effective error management process
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management and organizational performance. similarly, cannon and edmondson 
(2001) revealed that work groups in which errors are communicated and discussed 
perform better than groups in which errors lead to blaming.
However, there are several potential barriers that can impede effective error manage-
ment. limited cognitive ability, for instance, can reduce an individual’s ability to identify 
errors correctly within complex cause- and- effect chains, even when negative outcomes 
indicate that an error has been made (e.g. dörner, 1990; dörner & schaub, 1994). 
additionally, the literature argues that employees are usually unwilling to report their 
own errors if this carries a higher cost—emotional as well as monetary—than not report-
ing them (e.g. tynan, 2005; Zhao & olivera, 2006). consequently, effective error 
 management—for instance, preventing employees from making additional errors while 
dealing with an existing error—is an important challenge for organizations, which 
requires further study.
Most error management research has focused on safety issues in the healthcare sector 
(e.g. vogus, sutcliffe, & Weick, 2010) and in so- called high- reliability organizations 
(HRos) such as nuclear power plants, aircraft carriers, and aviation companies (e.g. 
Maurino, Reason, Johnston, & lee, 1995), since errors in these organizations can be 
disastrous to the physical health of their stakeholders. Managing errors effectively, 
however, is a task of significant importance for all organizations, since errors can also 
cause financial damage. although research on error management has often focused on 
professional service firms (psfs) from a physical safety point of view, research on the 
financial impact of error management is sparse (for an exception see van dyck et al., 
2005). Moreover, research has neglected specific characteristics of psfs that may influ-
ence the way employees deal with errors. such characteristics include service intangibility 
(lowendahl, 1997; lowendahl, Revang, & fosstenlokken, 2001) and the impact of 
working conditions in psfs, such as strong career orientation and fierce internal compe-
tition for limited promotion opportunities (Malhotra, Morris, & smets, 2010). this 
chapter addresses these research gaps by analyzing the error management problems of 
psfs as well as possible ways to overcome them. for this purpose, we present a review 
of the literature on human error and error management.
WHat is an eRRoR?
although the concept of error is frequently used in the literature, an agreed definition is 
lacking. a definition, however, is important to specify the object of investigation. our 
definition is based on the criteria most frequently mentioned in the error literature. using 
the most commonly mentioned characteristics, the concept of error can be defined as (1) 
an action in the context of work, (2) which could have been avoided (brodbeck, Zapf, 
prümper, & frese, 1993; norman, 1981; Reason, 1990; Zhao & olivera, 2006), (3) and 
which would be “judged as a deficient deviation from an expected standard” (4) “by 
knowledgeable and central members of a given occupation, organization, or local com-
munity of practice” (5) “at a given point of time” (bauer & Mulder, 2008: 117) and (6) 
which “may lead to actual or potentially negative consequences for organizational func-
tioning” (Zhao & olivera, 2006).
errors are commonly distinguished from violations (kriegesmann, kley, & schwering, 
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2005; Reason, 1990; Zhao & olivera, 2006). often, the distinction between these two 
concepts is rooted in the argumentation of cognitive psychology (Reason, 1990). 
psychologically orientated research on human dealings with error often defines the 
concept of error using different error taxonomies according to the level of cognitive regu-
lation of the acting individual (van dyck et al., 2005; Rasmussen, 1987; Reason, 1990; 
Zhao & olivera, 2006). thus slips (a person intended to act in a certain way, but the real 
action did not proceed according to the planned action) are distinguished from rule- based 
and knowledge- based errors (unintended performance gaps where the action did proceed 
as planned). since this approach is based on the cognitive regulation of the acting indi-
vidual, it is linked to their intentions or goals. thus, this approach does not consider 
successful violations to be errors, because they proceed as planned and reach their 
intended goal (Zhao & olivera, 2006). However, in organizational literature, some 
authors classify violations as a subcategory of errors (e.g. kriegesmann et al., 2005: 59), 
because both are deviations from expected standards which could damage the organiza-
tion. accordingly, organizations may feel compelled to punish unintended errors 
(Hendry, 2002) as well as violations (kriegesmann et al., 2005). violations are narrowed 
down to those undesirable actions that are based on a decision intentionally to break a 
rule—for example, opportunistic behavior or deliberate risk taking. Hence, for analytical 
reasons, violations may be distinguished from actions that are based on a combination 
of well- meant intentions and lack of knowledge—for example, honest incompetence 
(Hendry, 2002) and knowledge- based errors (Reason, 1990). in reality, however, organi-
zations may not identify the intentions of their employees, thereby failing to distinguish 
unintended errors from violations. this could enable employees to make violations 
appear as honest incompetence, for example by lying about their true reasons.
furthermore, some authors distinguish errors from actions that are suboptimal (Zhao 
& olivera, 2006), whereas others suggest that inefficient actions should be classified as 
errors (van dyck et al., 2005). While errors are regarded as actions that do not achieve 
the intended goal, inefficient behaviors lead to the final goal via a detour. Within the 
context of work, however, it has been argued that inefficient actions are erroneous, 
because people should constantly aim to work efficiently (Zapf, frese, & brodbeck, 1999: 
399). from this point of view, inefficient action should be classified as a deviation from 
an expected standard. besides, both employee errors and inefficient action put organiza-
tions at financial risk. furthermore, both may sometimes have similar origins, such as a 
lack of knowledge of how to perform better. accordingly, empirical research has revealed 
that “managers sometimes report inefficiencies as examples of errors” (van dyck et al., 
2005: 1229). Hence, one might assume that, in many cases, inefficient employee behavior 
would be subject to the same sanctions as errors. owing to the difficulty researchers and 
practitioners have in distinguishing errors from inefficiencies, inefficient action is under-
stood to be an error.
inteRaction betWeen latent conditions and 
baRRieRs to effective eRRoR ManaGeMent
Research on human error aims to reveal the antecedents that lead to undesired outcomes, 
such as failures within process, organizational breakdowns, and inappropriate task 
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fulfillment. as indicated above, error management is seen as an important and complex 
process that is often inappropriately fulfilled within organizations (van dyck et al., 2005; 
tucker & edmondson, 2003). in order to provide recommendations to improve error 
management, researchers need to understand why the error management process often 
fails within organizations. to put it another way, it has to be understood why employees 
commit additional errors while dealing with previous errors. since research on human 
error has highlighted several factors that are likely to promote the failure of complex 
processes, it appears worthwhile to apply knowledge about the origins of human error to 
situations where people are required to deal effectively with human error. this section 
aims to analyze how research on human error might explain inappropriate error 
 management.
in the literature, it has been frequently argued that undesired outcomes (e.g. an air-
plane crash or the financial failure of an innovative project) often result from a combina-
tion of active failures and latent conditions (e.g. Reason, 1990, 2000; sasou & Reason, 
1999), also known as latent failures (Reason, 1990). so far, however, the literature lacks 
an analysis of how these insights relate to situations where organizations are challenged 
to deal effectively with errors. active failures are erroneous actions “committed by people 
who are in direct contact with the patient or system” (Reason, 2000: 769); latent condi-
tions are defined as “the inevitable ‘resident pathogens’ within the system [that] . . . arise 
from decisions made by designers, builders, procedure writers, and top level manage-
ment” (Reason, 2000: 769). While active failures are located at the individual level, latent 
conditions describe organizational characteristics that promote the committing of errors. 
Reason (1990) makes a distinction between active failures and latent conditions when 
analyzing cause- and- effect chains that have led to catastrophes. the chernobyl disaster, 
for instance, was the result of active failures (e.g. employees disconnected the emergency 
core cooling system from the primary circuit) and latent conditions (e.g. employees were 
advised to perform this procedure as part of the test plan, even though it compromised 
the power plant’s safety systems) (Reason, 1990: 255).
it appears worthwhile to apply this distinction in order to understand why the error 
management process often fails. With regard to error management processes, latent con-
ditions can be understood as an organizational context that increases the amount of 
additional errors made by employees while managing other errors. for instance, it might 
be classified as active failure if employees fail to detect their own errors, for example if a 
cook fails to notice that he had used salt instead of sugar, whereas it might be classified 
as a latent condition if the organization fails to enable employees to detect their own 
errors—for example if a cook is not allowed to talk to the diners or a development team 
is not given enough time to test their inventions. Hence, barriers to effective error man-
agement are closely interrelated with latent conditions. We start by discussing the ele-
ments of latent conditions before providing insights into the interactions between latent 
conditions and the barriers they present to effective error management.
Elements of Latent Conditions Supporting Process Failure
the literature has identified several dimensions by which latent conditions promote 
errors in task fulfillment, such as (1) the scope of human or technical action required, (2) 
the challenge it presents to employees, (3) their abilities, and (4) their motivation. in the 
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following section, insights about the elements of latent conditions are discussed in rela-
tion to the following dimensions.
first, latent conditions influence the scope of human action necessary to fulfill a task. 
considering that errors are defined as specific human actions, the installation of technical 
systems (e.g. computers) into a work flow reduces the necessity for human action and thus 
the possibility of human error. therefore, transferring tasks from employees to technical 
systems diminishes skill limitations and opportunistic behavior as potential sources of 
human error. a computer- based spell checker, for instance, might improve a firm’s man-
agement of employees’ spelling mistakes.
second, latent conditions influence the challenges an employee faces while trying to 
fulfill a task (Reason, 1998). in order to capture the factors that influence the occurrence 
of errors, sasou and Reason (1999) introduce the concept of performance- shaping 
factors, which may be external (e.g. darkness, high work requirements), internal (e.g. 
fatigue, deficiencies in knowledge) or team- based (e.g. lack of communication, inappro-
priate task allocation). these factors are important elements of latent conditions, because 
they influence the scope of the challenge in fulfilling a task. the challenge of fulfilling a 
task becomes proportionally more complex under latent conditions, where the rules of 
correct action are unknown, unspecified, or inconsistent with other rules. under such 
conditions, employees face the challenge of selecting the action most likely to be appro-
priate. such situations may be characteristic of many psfs whose core business involves 
inventing new and unique solutions (e.g. top management consulting, advertising).
third, latent conditions influence employee abilities. for example, an organization’s 
approach to employee selection, promotion, and coaching must be regarded as part of 
the organization’s latent conditions that affect employee skills (Reason, 1998). several 
studies have revealed that effective training helps to improve employee ability and reduce 
the tendency to make errors (keith & frese, 2008). in addition to training, organizations 
also have the option of replacing employees with others who are less likely to commit 
errors.
fourth, latent conditions also influence the extent to which employees are motivated 
to accomplish a task for the benefit of their organization. incentive schemes are an impor-
tant element of latent conditions, and several theories assume that incentive schemes 
govern employee behavior. However, the literature indicates that employee characteris-
tics may be heterogeneous and that not all employees are influenced in the same way by 
a specific incentive scheme (davis, schoorman, & donaldson, 1997). social and financial 
incentives, for example, have been identified as a major factor in shaping employee behav-
ior (lubatkin, lane, collin, & very, 2007; Zahra, 2007). theories such as the principal–
agent theory assume that employees seek to maximize their utility and adapt their 
behavior on such considerations (eisenhardt, 1989). so called “agents” are supposed to 
betray the organization intentionally if this behavior is likely to increase their individual 
benefits. in contrast, some organizational theorists argue that employee behavior may be 
influenced by their intrinsic motivation rather than external incentive systems (davis et 
al., 1997). so- called “stewards” are supposed to reach self- fulfillment by aligning their 
behavior to the goals of the organization. because of their intrinsic motivation, stewards 
are also likely to behave to the benefit of the organization even if their behavior is not 
financially rewarded.
Research on human error has revealed that lack of motivation has a significant 
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influence on employee error; Reason (1990) found that in many cases system failures were 
induced not by lack of employee skills but rather by lack of willingness to fulfill a task 
according to well- known rules. Monitoring systems, which also form part of the latent 
conditions, are regarded as an appropriate instrument to supplement organizational 
incentive schemes, since they reduce the room for employees to act against the organiza-
tion’s interests (eisenhardt, 1989; lubatkin et al., 2007).
Barriers to Effective Error Management
several factors and mechanisms have been identified that potentially impede or promote 
elements of effective error management. the findings of the literature are presented below 
according to their impact on the three hallmarks of error management: detection, com-
munication, and handling of errors (figure 3.2).
Barriers to error detection
the detection of errors is considered an element of error management because it is the 
starting point for individual and organizational learning (bauer & Mulder, 2008), as well 
as being necessary for engaging in error handling (van dyck et al., 2005). Hence, enabling 
organizations to detect errors requires either the installation of technical systems or the 
enabling and motivation of employees to overcome detection problems. Research has 
enumerated several modes of error detection (sellen, 1994): (1) action- based detection, 
(2) outcome- based detection, and (3) detection through limiting functions.
action- based detection is defined as “catching an error on the basis of perception of 
some aspect of the erroneous action itself” (sellen, 1994: 481). this requires that the “cor-
rectness” of an action can be clearly evaluated. barriers to action- based error detection 
occur if deviations from the intended action cannot be sufficiently monitored (sellen, 
1994: 481). furthermore, action- based error detection might be impeded in situations 
where actions follow a rule that is in conflict with the mission of the organization at a 
higher level (baecker, 2003).
Necessity for






– Limited cognitive ability to analyze cause-and-eect chains (Dörner & Schaub, 1994)
– Insu­cient monitoring of actions and their results (Sellen, 1994)
– Lack of incentives/motivation to detect error (Zhao & Olivera, 2006)
– Unclear target setting (Sellen, 1994)
– Clear but insu­cient target setting (Baecker, 2003)
– Self-serving bias (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005)
– Lack of experience with own errors (Argyris, 1991)
– Emotional stimulus of error is too low (Gartmeier et al., 2008)
Detection Barriers
– Insu­cient nancial or emotional incentives (Zhao & Oliver, 2006)
– Lack of support (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003)
Handling Barriers
– Being concerned about sanctions (Zhao & Olivera, 2006)
– Insu­cient rewards for reporting errors (Weick & Sutcli, 2001)











































Figure 3.2 Barriers to effective error management
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outcome- based detection focuses on the product or consequences of an action. 
outcome- based detection requires the existence of a desired outcome that is measurable. 
outcome- based detection is hindered by ill- specified outcomes, problems in perceiving 
the outcome and failure to identify cause–effect relationships (sellen, 1994: 481). dörner 
and schaub (1994), for example, reveal that individuals are widely unable to identify the 
cause- and- effect chains in dynamic decision making, even if the outcomes are observable. 
the authors stress several factors that increase the likelihood that errors will not be cor-
rectly identified, including the number of variables that can be influenced by the person, 
the degree of interdependence of variables, the time lag between input and reaction of the 
variables, the time pressure on the person acting, and the time lag before receiving feed-
back on the result of the actions.
cannon and edmondson (2005) observed that humans have a tendency to ignore their 
own errors. they argue that this is not necessarily caused by fear of punishment or debase-
ment, but by psychological factors such as the maintenance of self- esteem. furthermore, 
it has been argued that a lack of negative emotions is—at least on  occasions—likely to 
decrease the chance of action- based and outcome- based error detection, because a painful 
stimulus may increase employee awareness of the need for improvement (Gartmeier et al., 
2008). another factor that supposedly hinders employees from correctly attributing 
failure to themselves is a lack of experience with their own errors, due to a lack of oppor-
tunity to experience their own fallibility (argyris, 1991: 103f.).
detection through limiting functions implies that errors are detected “because con-
straints in the external world prevent further action” (sellen, 1994: 481). for instance, 
those who reach the end of a blind alley before reaching their final destination are more 
likely to realize that they have taken a wrong turn. similarly to the outcome- based detec-
tion mode, error detection through limiting functions challenges employees to attribute 
the causes of the undesired outcomes and thus analyze the cause- and- effect chains. as 
stated above, several barriers hinder the employee’s ability to cope with these challenges.
Barriers to error communication
a lack of communication can cause information asymmetries about specific errors if 
other employees do not detect the very same error. thus, detection and communication 
are functionally interrelated, because repeated detection of the same error by different 
employees can compensate for a lack of communication.
in situations where individuals have an information asymmetry about errors and 
assume that these errors cannot be detected by anyone else, they may display a variety of 
reporting and non- reporting behaviors (Zhao & olivera, 2006). individuals may report 
errors as they are, rationalize their reporting, or blame someone else. non- reporting can 
be differentiated into covering up errors, handling them on one’s own, and ignoring them 
(Zhao & olivera, 2006). Zhao and olivera further argue that employee behavior decisions 
are based on cost–benefit considerations. employees supposedly take into account the 
costs (e.g. material costs, damage to personal image, reputation costs) and the benefits of 
reporting (e.g. self- concept benefits, learning benefits). they are unlikely to report errors 
if costs are high and benefits low. for instance, if employees who commit an error are 
punished by the organization (e.g. their career chances are reduced or they have to leave 
the company), employees have no incentive to report their errors, according to agency 
theory. therefore, they are likely to try to conceal their errors to avoid punishment 
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(tynan, 2005). edmondson (2004) provides evidence for this rationale; she reveals that 
teams with higher levels of psychological safety, that is, the belief that the team is safe for 
personal risk taking (edmondson, 1999), report more errors than teams with lower levels. 
Rybowiak, Garst, frese, and batinic (1999) show that high job uncertainty and career 
stress are positively correlated with the covering up of errors. the authors argue that 
employees tend to cover up errors if their communications are punished and their careers 
jeopardized. tynan (2005) indicates that individual employees and work groups are 
unlikely to seek support while trying to cope with a self- inflicted problem if this specific 
form of communication is expected to get them into trouble. failing to seek support, 
however, may reduce the chance of handling errors effectively.
Barriers to error handling
in a survey on problem handling by nurses, tucker and edmondson (2003) identify a 
dynamic relationship among different barriers to successful task accomplishment. they 
developed a model that considers the factors that negatively influence the overcoming of 
barriers to complete a work task. they argue that employee work flows are often dis-
rupted as problems occur that have to be dealt with, for example if a construction worker 
is missing the optimal tool to fulfill a certain task. problems are promoted by latent con-
ditions and by barriers to task completion. according to the authors, employees may 
address problems through both first- order and second- order problem solving. first- order 
problem solving refers to behavior where a problem is overcome by obtaining the 
required resources to resolve the specific situation, whereas second- order problem solving 
addresses the latent causes that promoted the problem. since problems are rooted in 
latent conditions, only the latter reduces the likelihood that a similar problem will recur. 
tucker and edmondson (2003) further reveal that successful first- order problem solving 
negatively influences employee efforts to engage in second- order problem solving. if 
employees successfully handle problems by themselves, they are unlikely to see a need to 
communicate their knowledge of latent conditions to upper levels of the organization. 
overall, their model indicates how valuable individual learning might prevent even more 
valuable organizational learning. However, successful error handling as a barrier to error 
communication does not necessarily imply the opportunistic intent of an employee. 
although quick error handling may be caused by an employee trying to cover up an error, 
it may also be caused by a well- meaning employee taking responsibility for correcting the 
error without involving or disturbing others (Zhao & olivera, 2006: 1024).
However, the literature has also identified barriers to error handling at the individual 
level. first, employees sometimes lack the motivation to handle errors, particularly if they 
believe that handling them will cause them more trouble than benefit (Zhao & olivera, 
2006). for instance, if the handling of an error is not acknowledged by other members of 
the organization, employees lack the incentive to invest in error handling. additional 
barriers to error handling are lack of ability (Zhao & olivera, 2006) and lack of support 
from others (tucker & edmondson, 2003).
Mechanisms of Latent Conditions Related to (In)effective Error Management
table 3.1 summarizes the multifarious impact of latent conditions on the elements of 
error management.
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on the one hand, this framework appears to point the way to success by combining 
insights about effective error management from the literature, as many studies address 
only limited areas of effective error management rather than drawing a holistic picture of 
the interrelations among each fragment (as an exception see tucker & edmondson, 
2003). on the other hand, as highlighted in the sections that follow, it is ineffective to 
focus on isolated mechanisms and ignore their interactions. if these interactions are 
neglected, contradictions may be overlooked and, consequently, the recommendations 
for improving error management may be insufficient, if improving a specific error man-
agement mechanism causes greater disruption to another. therefore, the literature sug-
gests a need for more emphasis on the interactions among mechanisms of effective error 
management (van dyck et al., 2005: 1237).
identification and discussion of tHe liteRatuRe’s 
iMplications foR eRRoR ManaGeMent
a review of the literature reveals three frequent recommendations for improving organi-
zational error management: (1) introducing safe environments, (2) providing incentives 
and rewards, and (3) introducing teamwork and team training. although these are inter-
related, we will discuss the effects of each of these on an organization under separate 
headings.
Safe Environments
based on the finding that fear of punishment discourages employees from communicat-
ing honestly about errors, researchers frequently recommend introducing an environ-
ment that allows employees to talk about their errors without fear of punishment (bauer, 
2008; edmondson, 1999; tynan, 2005; Weick & sutcliffe, 2001). the literature intro-
duces several approaches to promote employee willingness to talk about errors. first, 
organizations should provide their employees with psychological safety to overcome 
communication barriers. second, some authors suggest that organizations provide 
employees with some kind of immunity against punishment. third, evidence suggests 
that safe communication channels might increase employee communication about 
errors.
first, introducing psychological safety increases employee willingness to report 
errors. according to edmondson (1999) and tynan (2005), psychological safety is based 
on mutual respect among employees and characterized by a shared belief that they will 
not be rejected, embarrassed, or punished by colleagues for speaking up. such working 
conditions are closely related to proactive feedback- seeking that promotes learning, 
because employees are more likely to engage in social learning by sharing knowledge 
about their own errors with colleagues if they do not fear social punishment for revealing 
their errors (bauer, 2008; Zhao & olivera, 2006). despite its implications, however, the 
research rarely addresses how the pressures on employees who seek job promotion might 
limit the organization’s ability to promote psychological safety. presumably, competi-
tion among employees for limited chances of promotion would decrease their willingness 
to speak up among colleagues about their own errors, because they may wish to create 
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the impression that they deserve promotion. furthermore, exactly how management 
should behave to create such psychological safety remains unclear. for instance, tucker 
and edmondson (2003: 67) argue that “creating a psychologically safe work environ-
ment does not require managers [to] be excessively warm and friendly, but instead that 
they invite others to express their concerns and model fallibility by admitting their own 
errors.” implementing this may prove problematic, however, because it remains unspec-
ified how and why such an invitation should translate into mutual respect and trust. 
furthermore, this recommendation may be tautological for organizations not managed 
by their shareholders, since psychological safety is a precondition for psychological 
safety. Managers are supposed to create psychological safety by reporting honestly 
about their own errors. However, it has been argued that employees (including manag-
ers) are unlikely to report their own errors in an atmosphere that lacks psychological 
safety (edmondson, 1999; tynan, 2005). instead, psychological safety is regarded as an 
important factor that promotes a willingness to report one’s errors honestly. from a 
theoretical point of view, it appears questionable, if and under which conditions the 
development of psychological safety may be described by the concept of a misleading 
nash equilibrium, where all employees (managers included) are motivated to protect 
their reputation instead of investing in psychological safety. from a practical point of 
view, we assume that managers face many conflicts in promoting psychological safety 
“by admitting their own errors” if they are held accountable either by a supervisor or by 
the company’s owners and if they have to promote themselves to them as their best 
choice.
second, some authors recommend that organizations provide their employees with 
special immunity to increase communication about errors. van dyck et al. (2005: 1230), 
for example, suggest withholding punishment for communicating errors. still, the impli-
cations of withholding punishment are problematic for a number of reasons. More 
information is needed on how organizations could avoid all forms of social sanction 
against employees. furthermore, it remains unclear whether this includes direct punish-
ment for the error being reported (e.g. by immediately penalizing the employee) as well 
as indirect punishment (e.g. reducing the employee’s chances of promotion, or changing 
work conditions to the detriment of the employee who reported it). in either case, it is 
not specified under what conditions such a non- punishment culture might conflict with 
working conditions where employees compete with each other for reputation and/or 
promotion, as in many psfs such as management consultancies or law firms. 
furthermore, it remains unclear if and how organizations would protect themselves 
from exploitation by low- performing employees within such an atmosphere of immu-
nity. Regarding the last issue, there are concerns that this approach may have negative 
side effects. the concept of non- punishment is regarded as an instrument to overcome 
barriers to employee communication about their own errors (van dyck et al., 2005; 
Weick & sutcliffe, 2001). the implicit assumption is that employee behavior is related 
to a cost–benefit analysis, such that employees will disclose their own errors to the detri-
ment of the organization if they benefit from such opportunistic behavior. such situa-
tions and behavior are discussed by agency theory. agency theory, however, discourages 
organizations from implementing a non- punishment culture, because certain employees 
may try to exploit the organization if they are not punished for misbehavior. instead, 
agency theory advises organizations to apply governance mechanisms such as 
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monitoring and incentive systems, since a non- punishment atmosphere would alter the 
distribution of risk. employees would be relieved of personal risk even if they engaged 
in actions risky to the organization and relatively low in expected return on investment. 
if success is then rewarded, employees might escalate their engagement in such risky 
actions. from the employee’s perspective, this risk asymmetry can be characterized as 
“i win, the organization loses.” this argument is supported by kriegesmann, kerka, and 
kley (2006), who reveal that, within organizational environments where the failure of 
innovative projects is not strictly punished, employees increase their engagement in risky 
exploration. they reveal that this organizational environment produces mixed benefits. 
on the one hand it is likely to promote innovation, while on the other it is likely to reduce 
the relative success rate of innovation and thus increase the average cost of innovation, 
because anticipation of punishment for a failed venture tends to make the prospect of 
expensive experimentation unappealing. this observation parallels the findings of lee, 
edmondson, thomke, and Worline (2004: 312), who argue that “[r]ewards [!] systems 
that punish failures increase the costs of experimentation [for employees], and may make 
individuals reluctant to experiment” (see also baecker, 2003; cannon & edmondson, 
2005). in addition, establishing a non- punishment culture has limited value if it is virtu-
ally impossible to distinguish unintended errors from deliberate violations. a non- 
punishment atmosphere would then open the floodgates for employees to engage in 
opportunistic behavior. furthermore, there is doubt about the compatibility of this 
implication with internal career competition or job uncertainty. it would push career 
models to absurdity if errors committed by employees were not directly or indirectly 
considered when evaluating their performance and skills. errors might, for example, 
throw light on an employee’s lack of skills or motivation, which may not have been 
observed by the organization so far (e.g. hidden characteristics or hidden intentions). 
these concerns are in accord with Reason (1998: 303), who argues that a “culture in 
which all acts are immune from punishment would lack credibility in the eyes of the 
workforce.” Hence, concepts that aim to inhibit indirect punishment for errors appear 
utopian.
third, in order to enhance employee communication about errors, different practices 
have been implemented to create a safe communication channel. organizations such as 
hospitals (Weinberg, 2002), pharmacies (kanse, van der schaaf, vrijland, & van Mierlo, 
2006), and aviation companies (Green, 1990) have established anonymous and non- 
anonymous reporting systems to allow employees to report errors without fear of punish-
ment. several studies provide evidence that the installation of safe communication 
channels encourages employees to communicate openly about their errors. sucov et al. 
(2001) reveal that the additional application of an anonymous error reporting system in 
a medical institution significantly improves error detection compared to traditional inci-
dent reporting systems. Green (1990) describes the establishment of an independent 
organization in the aviation industry. this organization allows pilots to report their 
errors in complete confidence, although not anonymously. the external organization 
analyzes how these errors can be avoided in the future without short- dated replacement 
of the employee who committed the error. these safe communication channels, however, 
do not directly address the problem of employee detection of their own errors in the first 
place. nevertheless, employees may sometimes detect their own errors later if they are 
given information about their own (mis)behavior by a whistleblower. the “detour” of 
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such feedback might remove the conflict for employees who fear that giving critical feed-
back directly to their boss might cause anger and thus provoke direct or indirect sanc-
tions. since these forms of safe environment are based on anonymity, they require a 
minimum number of employees to be applicable.
Incentive and Reward Systems
some analyses of organizational error handling recommend that organizations revise 
their incentive systems. as stated in the previous section, agency theory argues that incen-
tive systems have the potential to motivate employees extrinsically to align their behavior 
with organizational goals. following the agency theory argument, incentive systems can 
motivate employees to engage in detection, communication, and handling of errors. 
Hence, van dyck et al. (2005: 1230) and Weick and sutcliffe (2001: 58) recommend that 
organizations reward communication about errors in order to motivate employees to 
report their own and colleagues’ errors. Weick and sutcliffe (2001: 58) recommend 
rewarding communication about one’s own errors—even in cases where the error has 
severely cost the organization. We wonder, however, whether employees should be 
rewarded again and again for reporting their errors if they commit more errors than their 
colleagues. We argue that such reward systems are likely to distort career systems to the 
point of absurdity.
agency theory argues that employees are likely to strive either to receive an incentive 
or to avoid punishment. from this perspective, the combination of (1) a career- orientated 
HRM system that aims to reward behavior aligned to the organization’s goals with (2) a 
feedback culture is likely to promote employee efforts to engage in key aspects of effective 
error management. if employees are rewarded for reporting the errors of others, they are 
likely to increase their efforts to detect such errors. thus a social monitoring or “error 
witch hunt” system is created. as a consequence, it becomes more difficult and risky for 
employees to cover up their own errors, since they have to fear detection by a colleague. 
Hence, employees are forced to increase attempts to handle their own errors quickly. 
furthermore, the combined conditions of social monitoring and sanctions against hiding 
their own errors put pressure on employees “voluntarily” to disclose their own errors that 
are likely to be detected by someone else. However, this argument is a set of hypotheses 
based on the tenets of agency theory, and it needs empirical analysis. nevertheless, 
Rybowiak at al. (1999: 534) found a strong correlation between “error competence and 
learning from errors” and “need for achievement.” furthermore, stock, Mcfadden, and 
Gowen’s (2007) study provides evidence that hospitals with a control orientation provide 
better patient safety than their competitors.
Teamwork and Team Training
teams and team training are further recommendations for organizations to prevent 
errors and improve error management. these approaches are especially recommended 
in the aviation and healthcare industries, and their effects have been tested by research-
ers (alonso et al., 2006; barach, 2007; salas, burke, bowers, & Wilson, 2001). burke, 
Wilson, and salas (2005) believe that teams are one of the most important mechanisms 
for reducing errors within HRos, and consider their introduction a prerequisite for 
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organizations to develop into HRos. on the one hand, teams have a monitoring func-
tion, since the behavior and work of team members are constantly monitored by other 
members of the team. However, when the team faces joint responsibility, this monitor-
ing function may displace the boundaries of communication from the individual to the 
team level, rather than entirely overcoming them. on the other hand, teams also 
provide a back- up function, since the occurrence of errors can be reduced by double 
checking. teams, however, have to be constantly trained if they are to improve an 
organization’s error management. cook, Hoas, Guttmannova, and Joyner (2004), for 
instance, recommend interdisciplinary training of healthcare teams to improve the 
ability of all team members to identify medical errors. industries such as aviation and 
healthcare try to increase the positive effects of teamwork by introducing training 
programs to prepare teams to handle errors effectively and increase customer safety 
(barach, 2007).
nevertheless, sasou and Reason’s (1999) investigation of the performance- shaping 
factors within teams reveals that teams cannot be considered a panacea per se, because 
several factors, such as lack of communication, inappropriate task allocation and over- 
trusting, are likely to promote errors within work groups. in a review of the literature on 
crew resource management in the aviation industry, salas et al. (2001) showed that team 
building and crew resource management may enhance learning but not necessarily reduce 
errors.
cHallenGes Related to ManaGinG eRRoRs in psfs
Most research on how organizations deal with errors does not take into account the spe-
cific characteristics of profit- orientated psfs, whereas hardly any research on for- profit 
psfs focuses on error management. in order to understand how psfs deal with errors, 
we have to transfer our knowledge about organizational error handling to the specific 
context of psfs.
because of the characteristics of psfs, such as the intangibility of the product 
(lowendahl, 1997; lowendahl et al., 2001), a special set of latent conditions is present 
that differs from those of other organizations. in the following section we outline the 
special challenges psfs face in managing errors effectively. these originate from the dif-
ficulty of evaluating professional services. We will concentrate our discussion on the 
context of psfs that have no protected designation, because psfs such as management 
consulting are supposed to face even greater challenges in bridging client uncertainties 
that might impede engagement in a business relationship. While the professional system 
can, to a degree, bridge client uncertainties for psfs like auditing or law firms, there is 
little professional trust for management consultancies (Glückler & armbrüster, 2003). 
Hence, these companies rely to a large extent on client trust in the consultancy itself. this 
implies that a consultancy’s reputation may be an extremely important intangible asset, 
which is supported by its importance in the purchasing of consultancies (see e.g. clark, 
1993; dawes, dowling, & patterson, 1992). because errors are likely seriously to damage 
reputations, effective error management can be regarded as essential to protect a consul-
tancy’s reputation.
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Problems with Error Detection in PSFs
Research has shown that professional services firms often operate under conditions of 
uncertainty and ambiguity (alvesson, 1993, 2001). Hence, professionals such as consult-
ants face a lack of rules about how to act correctly (Mohe & stollfuß, 2009). these find-
ings align with the literature’s insights that management consulting lacks a defined base 
of knowledge that is adequate to overcome consultants’ struggle with ambiguity (Glückler 
& armbrüster, 2003). thus, the range of actions that cannot be classified ex ante as right 
or wrong is relatively wide. accordingly, many actions cannot be aligned to predefined 
patterns of behavior. even though higher- level goals may be familiar (e.g. curing a 
patient, improving the client’s organizational strategy, increasing company profitability), 
employees often have to decide ad hoc which action is most likely to reach these goals. if 
employees face a lack of knowledge about the cause- and- effect chains of these ad hoc 
actions, possibilities for action- based error detection are considerably constrained. 
furthermore, objective evaluation of the effects of professional services like business 
consulting is limited by the nature of the service. characteristics such as ambiguity 
(alvesson, 1993, 2001), immateriality, social interaction, and complex and partially invis-
ible side effects (clark, 1995; clark & salaman, 1998; ernst & kieser, 2002) impede the 
objective evaluation of a professional’s work, because these characteristics minimize 
employees’ possibilities of understanding all cause- and- effect chains that are relevant for 
engaging in valid outcome- based error detection. these difficulties in detecting errors 
may make it easier for employees to shield their errors from detection by others. 
especially within psfs such as business consultancies, it seems almost impossible to 
evaluate actions without knowing their specific context. However, knowing the context 
of the professional service may require observation of the interactions between service 
provider and service consumer. thus, employees of professional services possess a degree 
of discretion which provides an opportunity to hide their errors.
Mechanisms Relating to Error Communication and Handling in PSFs
We argue that many employees in psfs operate under conditions that tend to promote 
their willingness to engage in internal impression management. psfs like top manage-
ment consultancies, law firms, and auditing firms are thought to apply rigid human 
resource management systems whereby employees are regularly either promoted upwards 
or laid off (Greenwood & empson, 2003). this system is supposed to create “little socially 
acknowledged space for people to rationalize failures” (alvesson & kärreman, 2007: 
721). alvesson and kärreman (2004) provide evidence that, under these working condi-
tions, employee loyalty when dealing with errors in trade- off situations lies with the team 
rather than the organization. based on the rationale of Zhao and olivera (2006), we can 
argue that the cost of error communication is high in psfs with rigid HRM systems, since 
reporting one’s own errors might reduce one’s chance of promotion. therefore, the like-
lihood of reporting errors is reduced. accordingly, nippa and ehrhardt (2003: c5) argue 
that rigid HRM practices within consultancies might “lead to inferior returns as a rat- race 
for limited top ranks is likely to occur.” similarly, pfeffer (2001) argues that fighting the 
war for talent is hazardous to an organization’s health, because a war for talent might 
induce a detrimental war among talented employees. such a war, however, might be an 
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incentive for employees to handle their own errors quickly and monitor their colleagues. 
Handling their own errors quickly reduces the chance of being detected and exposed by 
colleagues, while monitoring colleagues increases the likelihood of detecting their errors 
and so reducing their chance of being promoted. besides this kind of social monitoring, 
formalized monitoring systems are also supposed to counteract employee tendencies to 
withhold knowledge about errors.
Research reveals that many psfs apply a variety of monitoring systems. alvesson and 
kärreman (2004: 431) observed a fairly strictly formalized feedback culture among 
employees and projects in a consultancy. employees were evaluated at regular intervals 
by their managers regarding their personal development and overall performance. 
several standardized evaluation practices, such as apprenticeship (Greenwood & empson, 
2003: 918), standardized software, and policy documents (alvesson & kärreman, 2004: 
431), were applied to achieve (and/or signal) a fair and unbiased evaluation process. 
However, the limitations of the monitoring systems were closely related to the consider-
able problem of evaluating professional services, which leaves room for internal impres-
sion management. Hence, alvesson and kärreman (2007) raise doubts about the validity 
of the evaluation system. furthermore, schoeneborn (2008) indicates that consultants 
utilized the ambiguity of their company’s powerpoint- based knowledge management 
system for internal impression management. He reveals that the knowledge management 
system of this company impeded the potential to learn from the errors of other project 
teams, owing to the ambiguity of the powerpoint presentations. frequently, these 
powerpoint presentations were the only source of information about past project proc-
esses for other employees. However, schoeneborn’s investigation indicates that these 
presentations were exploited by employees to present a consistent and rational project 
process to their colleagues. potential ambiguities, doubts, errors, or diversions inherent 
in the project process were not reported in the powerpoint presentations (schoeneborn, 
2008: 172). thus, the powerpoint presentations can be regarded as a whitewashed version 
of the projects. likewise, alvesson and kärreman (2004) observed tendencies among 
consultants to whitewash their performance. consultants were observed not to reveal 
their overtime to the project controller in order to increase their recorded ratio of output 
to hours worked (alvesson & kärreman, 2004). Whereas the first kind of impression 
management reduces organizational learning, the second promotes the misallocation of 
human resources.
argyris (1991) observed that consultants dealt defensively with their own errors. 
consultants “projected the blame for any problems away from themselves and onto what 
they said were unclear goals, insensitive and unfair leaders, and stupid clients” (argyris, 
1991: 101). Hence, argyris (1991) and ernst (2002) reveal that consultants tend to 
attribute the cause of undesired outcomes to others. although these consultants were 
considered to deal defensively with their own errors, “they presented themselves as cham-
pions of learning” (argyris, 1991: 105). on the one hand, these observations can be 
interpreted as an indicator that consultants face major problems in correctly detecting 
and evaluating their errors. on the other hand, they could also indicate that consultants 
tend to engage in impression management when evaluating their errors. according to 
argyris (1991: 104), consultants deal defensively with errors to protect themselves from 
guilt for being overly paid for a service that had room for improvement.
overall, it has been estimated that the HRM systems in top management consultancies 
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create a curious situation: on the one hand, they are said to “motivate professionals . . . 
to work excessively hard” (Greenwood & empson, 2003), attract high performers by 
giving them recognition, support skills development among high performers (alvesson & 
kärreman, 2007), and enhance the consultancy’s reputation by signaling to clients that 
they have high- performance personnel (armbrüster, 2004). on the other hand, we argue 
that the internal tournament situation is likely to promote a selection process that tends 
to crowd out intrinsic honesty about employees’ own errors in the company.
The Limited Applicability of the Literature’s Error Management Advice
owing to the special latent conditions within psfs, the suitability of the recommenda-
tions in the literature to improve error management is limited. because of the lack of 
empirical research, the following section has to be seen as a theoretical discussion rather 
than empirically proven knowledge.
the introduction of a broad non- punishment environment is probably doomed to fail 
because of insurmountable conflicts with psfs’ career systems. the implementation of 
anonymous communication channels, however, seems possible for large psfs. assuming 
competition among employees does not necessarily prevent mutual respect; cultivating 
respect among employees is likely to promote open communication about errors. 
However, future research needs to explore which instruments are likely to promote inter-
nal respect.
as highlighted in our discussion on the literature’s implications for reward systems, 
organizations face many trade- offs, because increasing one factor to promote a particular 
aspect of error management (e.g. increasing employees’ willingness to handle their own 
errors quickly) often increases other factors that hinder error management (e.g. decreas-
ing willingness to report their errors). furthermore, the estimated effects of reward 
systems diverge considerably according to which theory of employee motivation is 
applied. However, in either case, social monitoring is regarded as an effective instrument 
to improve error management. psfs have several options to bridge the technical prob-
lems of making employees monitor each other, for example via job rotation, transparent 
office architecture, and all kinds of group reflection and teamwork. implementing team-
work does not conflict with the specific characteristics of psfs. However, as indicated by 
the foregoing discussion, teamwork cannot be regarded as a panacea. although team-
work is said to induce many positive effects, the literature reveals several related prob-
lems.
overall, our discussion reveals that the literature provides few insights that are easily 
adopted by managers in psfs to improve error management in their organizations. 
suggestions such as creating psychological safety are vague, and other more specific rec-
ommendations appear questionable. van dyck et al. (2005: 1230), for instance, argue 
that some organizations “have cultivated certain systematic approaches to facilitating 
communication about errors. for example, an american consulting firm throws a party 
whenever projects fail, explicitly creating a situation in which communication about 
errors can naturally occur.” one might wonder, however, whether such a party really 
does provide an open atmosphere within consulting companies, or whether it is more 
likely to discredit the project team by drawing attention to its entire membership as 
 examples of incompetence.
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in response to these deficits, we carried out an exploratory survey to reveal how man-
agement consultancies might promote a reflective method of dealing with errors. this 
survey took place between May and July 2008. overall, 37 management consultants, 
employees of management consulting associations, and researchers in the field of man-
agement consulting were surveyed. according to the delphi method (Häder, 2009), these 
experts answered questionnaires in three rounds (response rates were 92 percent, 84 
percent, and 81 percent, respectively). in the second round, participants were asked to 
suggest management instruments that might improve consultants’ reflective and self- 
critical handling of errors. the answers were clustered into 11 different groups; in the 
third round, the same respondents had to evaluate the effectiveness of these 11 instru-
ments. as shown in table 3.2, instruments that support conscious reflection about 
projects, such as feedback by the project leader (mean=6.11) and the formulation of 
“lessons learned” (mean=5.69), were regarded as the most effective, whereas instruments 
that were uncoupled from a concrete project, such as communication training 
(mean=3.70), were regarded as less effective. However, since these recommendations by 
our survey respondents have not been empirically analyzed, their contribution to more 
effective error management is questionable. future research needs to specify precisely the 
potential form of these instruments, their external preconditions and mechanisms, and 
their transferability to all types of psfs.
conclusion
this chapter has provided an overview of the literature dealing with errors in organiza-
tions. a selection of implications on how to improve error management in organizations 
was presented and discussed. We identified and addressed the research gap regarding 
error management in psfs. furthermore, the opinions of experts in the field of manage-
ment consulting were presented.
Table 3.2 Effectiveness of instruments for consultants to learn from errors
instruments that promote consultant learning from error Mean standard deviation
feedback from the project leader 6.11 1.07




peer counseling 5.00 1.36
360- degree feedback 4.80 1.50
customer satisfaction survey 4.71 1.58
training with case studies 4.54 1.67
training by role reversal (consultant/client) 4.00 1.46
communication training 3.70 1.58
Note: n (including “don’t know”) = 29; 7- point likert scale: 1 = “no effectiveness at all” and 7 = “very 
effective.”
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our analysis shows that research has revealed a variety of mechanisms related to effec-
tive error management. However, most research has focused primarily on safety aspects 
within the healthcare sector and HRos. Research on psfs has focused primarily on 
physical safety, while research on the financial impact of error management is sparse. 
furthermore, the focus is often on isolated mechanisms of error management, such as the 
impact of a non- punishment culture on employees’ willingness to share knowledge about 
their own errors, without analyzing the interactions with other error management mech-
anisms, for example the impact of a non- punishment culture on employees’ motivation 
to prevent errors in the first place. as a consequence, this chapter reveals that many 
insights on how to improve error management turn out to be questionable if one consid-
ers their possible side effects. accordingly, some applications appear incompatible with 
the work context in many psfs. psychological safety, for instance, is touted as an instru-
ment to enhance employees’ communication about their own errors, even though little is 
known about how psychological safety could be promoted in an environment where 
many highflying employees compete for limited opportunities for promotion.
despite this criticism, our chapter extracts several insights about effective error man-
agement that may help managers to reflect on how to improve error management in their 
organizations. several barriers to effective error management are discussed, and implica-
tions for how to overcome these barriers are provided. for instance, instruments that do 
not directly give employees the impression that they will be mistrusted by the organiza-
tion or that increase social monitoring are regarded as worthwhile. instruments men-
tioned that meet these requirements include job rotation, transparent office architecture, 
and all forms of group reflection. in particular, the positive effects of teamwork on error 
management were discussed. finally, we refer to instruments such as “lessons learned” 
that were advocated and evaluated in a delphi survey of 37 experts in the field of manage-
ment consulting.
even though this chapter presents a broad overview of the literature on error manage-
ment in psfs, we still find many arguments rather hypothetical. We therefore believe that 
there is a strong need for future empirical research along the lines suggested in this 
chapter.
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